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Abstract
We give a new algorithm for approximating the Discrete Fourier transform of an
approximately sparse signal that has been corrupted by worst-case L0 noise, namely
a bounded number of coordinates of the signal have been corrupted arbitrarily. Our
techniques generalize to a wide range of linear transformations that are used in data
analysis such as the Discrete Cosine and Sine transforms, the Hadamard transform,
and their high-dimensional analogs. We use our algorithm to successfully defend
against well known L0 adversaries in the setting of image classification. We give
experimental results on the Jacobian-based Saliency Map Attack (JSMA) and the
Carlini Wagner (CW) L0 attack on the MNIST and Fashion-MNIST datasets as
well as the Adversarial Patch on the ImageNet dataset.
1 Introduction
In the last several years, neural networks have made unprecedented achievements on computational
learning tasks like image classification. Despite their remarkable success, neural networks have been
shown to be brittle in the presence of adversarial noise [SZS+13]. Many effective attacks have been
proposed in the context of computer vision that reliably generate small perturbations to input images
(sometimes imperceptible to humans) that drastically change the network’s classification of the image
[MFF15, GSS15, CW16]. As deep learning becomes more integrated into our everyday technology,
the need for systems that are robust to adversarial noise grows, especially in applications to security.
A lot of work has been done to improve robustness and defend against adversarial attacks [PMW+16,
TKP+17, MMS+17]. However many approaches rely on knowing the attack strategy in advance and
too few proposed methods for robustness offer theoretical guarantees and may be broken by a new
attack shortly after they’re published. As such, recent deep learning literature has seen an arms race
of back-and-forth attacks and defenses reminiscent of cryptography before it was grounded in firm
theoretical foundations.
In this work, we give a framework for improving the robustness of classifiers to adversaries with L0
noise budgets. That is, adversaries are restricted in the number of input coordinates they can corrupt,
but may corrupt each arbitrarily. Our framework is based on a new Sparse Discrete Fourier transform
(DFT) that is robust to worst-case L0 noise added in the input domain. We call such transformations
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L0-robust. In particular, we show how to recover the top coefficients of an approximately sparse
signal that has been corrupted by worst-case L0 noise.
Our theoretical results use techniques from compressed sensing [CRT06, BCDH10]. In fact we
provide a much more general framework for building L0-robust sparse transformations, that applies
to many transformations used in practice such as all discrete variants of the Fourier transform, the
Sine and Cosine Transforms, the Hadamard transform, and their higher-dimensional generalizations.
Our approach can be used to develop algorithms with the following benefits:
• Provable performance guarantees for image recovery. Our approach leverages rigorous
results in compressed sensing that allow us to prove theorems about L0-robust sparse
transformations under mild assumptions that typically hold in practice.
• Worst-case adversaries for image corruption. The guarantees of our algorithms hold for
all adversaries that stay within the noise budget, given that the input signals are sparse in the
Fourier or related domains. In particular, our defenses do not require prior knowledge of the
adversary’s attack strategy.
• Generality. Our framework is general purpose and is compatible with a variety of basis
transformations commonly used in scientific computing.
The connection between our L0-robust transformations and adversarial attacks on images is as
follows. Many natural images are sparse in Fourier bases such as the basis used in the Discrete
Cosine transform (DCT). Indeed, this is a necessary feature for compression algorithms like JPEG to
work. Through this lens, corrupted images can be viewed as noisy signals that are sparse in some
domain and our techniques allow us to reconstruct these sparse signals under worst-case/adversarial
L0 noise. This reconstruction allows us to correct the corruptions made by the adversary to produce
something provably close to the original image, which should intuitively improve network accuracy.
We evaluate this intuition experimentally in Section 4.
A notable feature of our framework is the focus on L0 noise. This threat model has been considered
in previous works and L0 attacks and defenses have been developed [CW16, PMJ+15, PMW+16].
While L2 attacks are more commonly studied, many of the most high-profile recent real-world
attacks actually fit in the L0 model, such as the graffiti-like road sign perturbations of [EEF+17],
the eyeglasses that fool facial recognition software [SBBR16], and the patch that can make almost
any image get labeled as a ‘toaster’ by state-of-the-art classifiers [BMR+17]. In general, physical
obstructions in images or malicious splicing of audio or video files are realistic threats that can be
modeled as L0 noise, whereas L2 attacks may be more difficult to carry out in the physical world.
Our results have wide applicability in signal processing since it is well known that audio/video signals
are sparse in the Fourier or wavelet domains. Signal processing is important in many areas of science
and medicine including MRI, radio astronomy, and facial recognition. Errors are ubiquitous in the
above applications, whether due to natural artifacts, sensor failures, or malicious tampering. Our
approach gives theoretical guarantees for sparse recovery of such sparse signals under adversarial
errors.
In Section 4, we give experimental results that demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach against
leading L0 attacks. For example, in one experiment the network accuracy drops from 88.5% on
uncorrupted images to 24.8% on adversarial images with 30 pixels corrupted, but after our correction,
network accuracy returns to 83.1%. On another attack, the adversary is free to choose its own budget
and network accuracy drops from 87.8% all the way to 0% (the adversary succeeds on every image)
but after running our correction algorithm, network accuracy returns to 85.7%.
In Section 2, we set up the problem and discuss related work. We give new theoretical results in
Section 3. In Section 4, we evaluate our framework on three leading L0 attacks in the literature: the
JSMA attack of Papernot et al [PMJ+15], the L0 attack from Carlini and Wagner (CW) [CW16], and
the adversarial patch from Brown et al [BMR+17].
Notation For a vector v, we let vh(k) and vt(k) denote the head(k) and tail(k) of v. That is, vh(k)
denotes the vector containing just the k largest coordinates of v in absolute value with all other
coordinates set to 0 and vt(k) = v − vh(k). For example if v = [−3, 2, 1] then vh(2) = [−3, 2, 0] and
vt(2) = [0, 0, 1]. We refer to vh(k) as the “top k coefficients of v”. For a vector v, we let vˆ = Fv,
where F is the contextual linear transformation. We use the phrase, “projection of v to its top-k
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F -coefficients”, to mean the result of F−1(Fv)h(k). That is, calculate the top-k coefficients of Fv,
set the remaining coefficients to 0 and then invert the result to back to the original domain by applying
F−1. Unless specified, ‖·‖ denotes the L2 norm of a vector. For a scalar c, |c| denotes the absolute
value when c ∈ R and denotes the modulus of c when c ∈ C. We say that a vector v is k-sparse if all
but k of its entries are 0. We say that v is approximately (k, )-sparse if
∥∥xt(k)∥∥ ≤  · ‖x‖. We define
Mk to be the set of all k-sparse vectors. ~0 denotes the all-zeroes vector.
2 Overview
2.1 L0-Robust Sparse Fourier Transform
Problem Setup: The key property that we use is that natural images are approximately sparse in
frequency bases like the 2D Discrete Fourier basis or the 2D Discrete Cosine basis. This sparsity is
exploited in image and video compression algorithms like JPEG and MPEG. The DFT and DCT are
just linear transformations (in fact change of bases) from the space of images to a frequency domain.
So given a d× d image, we model it as approximately sparse in one of these bases, which from now
on we will just refer to as the ‘Fourier basis’. Note that once the basis is fixed we can think of the
image x ∈ Rn (n = d2) as an approximately sparse vector in the corresponding Fourier basis.
Our goal is to approximate the top-k Fourier coefficients of a vector x even after it has been corrupted
with adversarial L0 noise. We do not know the locations or magnitudes of the corruptions but we do
assume that we know an upper bound on the number of corrupted coordinates. In other words, if F is
the Fourier matrix (the matrix corresponding to the Discrete Fourier linear transformation), we want
to approximate xˆh(k) where xˆ = Fx. This can be modeled as the following problem:
Problem 2.1 (Main Problem). Given a corrupted vector y = x+ e where x ∈ Rn is approximately
k-sparse in the Fourier basis and e is exactly t-sparse in the standard basis (i.e. has L0 norm bounded
by t), approximate xˆh(k).
We will solve the above problem by splitting y into x′ + e′ + β where x′ is exactly k-sparse in the
Fourier domain, e′ is t-sparse in the standard basis and β is an error term bounded in L2 norm by
the tail of x. Our techniques are not limited to Fourier matrices and in fact extend naturally to other
transformations like wavelets, but for simplicity we will use the term Fourier throughout.
Related Work: Our setting is reminiscent of extensively studied dimensionality reduction tech-
niques like Robust PCA [CLMW11] for recovery of low rank matrices from L0 corrupted data. These
have wide applicability in machine learning although, in that setting, they are not able to handle truly
adversarial noise and make some assumptions on the error distribution. Our results on the other hand,
can protect against worst-case adversaries bounded in their L0 noise budget, for sparse recovery.
Variants of the Sparse Fourier Transform have been studied [HIKP12a, HIKP12b, IKP14] but that
work is concerned with recovering xˆh(k) given an approximately sparse vector x, using sublinear
measurements. Our focus is on recovering xˆh(k) when some of the measurements might be corrupted
and we show a tight tradeoff between the number of measurements corrupted versus the quality of
recovery we can ensure.
We model images as being approximately sparse in the Fourier domain and prove that in such
approximately sparse signals, it is possible to recover from L0 budgeted adversaries. In a similar
manner, GANs have been used [SKC18, IJA+17] to model the distribution of unperturbed images,
and to detect adversarial perturbations and recover from them, but these approaches are not able to
provide theoretical guarantees of recovery.
Our Techniques: Our main result uses techniques from the field of compressed sensing (CS)
[CRT06, BCDH10] and properties of Fourier (and related) matrices. Using these, we prove that
Algorithm 1 converges to a good solution to Problem 2.1, where, by a good solution we mean that it
is close to the true solution in the L∞ norm.
In iteration i of Algorithm 1, xˆ[i] is an estimate of xˆh(k) and e[i] is an estimate of e. In iteration
i+ 1, the algorithm uses the previous estimates, e[i] and xˆ[i] to update its estimates by solving the
linear equation y = F−1xˆ + e and projecting onto the top k Fourier coefficients of y − e[i]. Note
that while this algorithm is intuitive it does not necessarily converge to the true solution for similar
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Algorithm 1 Iterative Hard Thresholding (IHT) [BCDH10].
Input: Positive integers k, t, and T . y = x+ e, where x ∈ Rn is approximately k-sparse in the
Fourier basis and e ∈ Rn is exactly t-sparse in the standard basis. Fourier matrix F .
Output: xˆh(k), approximation of the top k Fourier coefficients of x.
1: function IHT(y = x+ e, F, k, t, T )
2: xˆ[1] ← ~0
3: e[1] ← ~0
4: for i = 1 · · ·T do
5: xˆ[i+1] ← (F (y − e[i]))h(k)
6: e[i+1] ← (y − F−1xˆ[i])h(t)
7: end for
8: return xˆ[T+1]
9: end function
settings. For example, if instead of the L0 norm, e was bounded in the L∞ norm, then information
theoretically, there is no algorithm which can give a good solution and hence this algorithm would
not be able to either. In our setting though, we can show that Algorithm 1 has an exponentially fast
convergence towards a good solution to Problem 2.1 and moreover the guarantees we get are tight
in the information theoretic sense. We state our result below for a general class of transformations
which includes the DFT, DCT and their higher-dimensional versions.
Theorem 2.2 (Main Theorem). Let F ∈ Cn×n be an orthonormal matrix, such that each of its entries
Fij , |Fij | is O(1/
√
n). Let xˆ = Fx ∈ Cn be (k, )-sparse, e ∈ Rn be t-sparse and y = F−1xˆ+ e.
Let xˆ[T ] = IHT(y, F, k, t, T ), for T = O(log(‖x‖+ ‖e‖)), then
1.
∥∥xˆ[T ] − xˆh(k)∥∥∞ = O(√t/n · ∥∥xˆt(k)∥∥) = O(√t/n · ‖xˆ‖)
2.
∥∥xˆ[T ] − xˆh(k)∥∥ = O(√kt/n · ∥∥xˆt(k)∥∥) = O(√kt/n · ‖xˆ‖) (In fact (1) implies (2).)
Note the strong L∞ - L2 guarantee that Theorem 2.2 gives us, with a tight dependence between t,
the L0 budget of the adversary and (, k), the sparsity parameters of the inputs. Also, our choice of
recovering just the top-k coordinates of xˆ, i.e. xˆh(k), instead of all of xˆ is important. In the latter
case, no matter what t is, any solution we recover would incur an L2 error of Ω(
∥∥xˆt(k)∥∥), even when
the adversary corrupts only one coordinate (t = 1), while in our case, with t = o(n/k), we get an L2
error that vanishes with n and is equal to o(
∥∥xˆt(k)∥∥) (by Theorem 2.2).
2.2 Defending against L0 budgeted adversarial examples
We model images as approximately k-sparse vectors in the 2D-DCT domain. Using the results from
Section 2.1, we can recover the top-k coefficients in the face of a worst-case adversary with an L0
budget. To apply this to image classifiers, we want to build a neural network to recognize images
projected to their top-k 2D-DCT coefficients. This motivates the following framework for building
classifiers that are robust to L0 adversaries:
1. Train a neural network on images projected to their top-k 2D-DCT coefficients. We refer to
such projected images as “compressed images”. 2
2. On adversarial input images we run our L0-robust DCT algorithm to recover the top-k
coefficients. Then transform the sparse image back to the original domain.
3. Run the recovered/corrected image through the network.
In Section 2.1, we saw that recovering the top-k projection of an image gives better theoretical
bounds than recovering the whole image. Hence it is important that the neural network is also trained
to recognize compressed images. Training only on compressed images could possibly reduce the
accuracy of neural networks, but as has been observed and used in practice (e.g. the JPEG and
MPEG compression algorithms), small images contain most of their information in relatively few
2Indeed the JPEG lossy-compression algorithm essentially does such a top-k projection!
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coefficients in the frequency domain. This is validated on our datasets, where we incur a < 1% loss
in accuracy on MNIST and < 2.5% for Fashion-MNIST when training on compressed rather than
original images. Note that one still needs our correction algorithm for L0-corrupted images, since a
naive compression of an adversarial example (by taking its top-k projection) will not get classified
correctly by a neural network in general. For example, if 1 pixel of the image is corrupted to have an
extremely high magnitude, this would propagate into the top-k coefficients of the DCT of the image
too and the resulting compressed image will be nowhere close to the original uncorrupted image.
Our correction algorithm does not depend on the magnitude of the corruptions, only their number (t).
Hence both the training of the neural network on compressed images and the correction algorithm are
essential to our framework.
2.3 Reverse Engineering Attacks
In step 2 of our framework, we use Theorem 2.2 to get strong guarantees on the distance δ, between
the original compressed image x and the recovered image. Ideally, δ will be so small that no
adversarial examples exist in the δ-ball around x. This may not always be achieved in practice
though and there might exist a small number of adversarial examples that are in the δ-ball from the
original image. This leaves open the possibility, that an attacker could reverse engineer our algorithm
and design an adversarial example that, when corrected, yields a (potentially different) adversarial
example inside the δ-ball centered at x (although it is unclear how one would achieve this, as our
defense is non-differentiable). Such an attack can be prevented by initializing the IHT algorithm
with random vectors xˆ[1], e[1] (instead of all-zeros vectors) so that the resulting recovered image is
not deterministic. Since there are only a small number of adversarial examples in the δ-ball, this
randomization would ensure that a reverse engineering attack would fail to hit an adversarial example,
with high probability. The guarantees of the IHT algorithm (Theorem 2.2) are independent of the
starting vectors and continue to hold with the randomized initialization. The IHT algorithm used for
the experiments reported in this work is not randomized, because current attacks were not designed
to reverse engineer our defense, and the deterministic IHT itself gives good results.
3 Proof of Main Result
In this section we prove Theorem 2.2, which says that Algorithm 1 converges to a good solution
(one that is close to the true vector in the L∞ norm) to Problem 2.1. Our proof uses techniques from
compressed sensing. The main problem studied in compressed sensing is reconstructing a signal x
from few linear measurements. For arbitrary signals, this task is impossible, however the main idea
of compressed sensing is that signals that are approximately sparse can be recovered using fewer than
n linear measurements. This is modeled as,
Problem 3.1. Given observations y = Mx where x ∈ Cn is an approximately sparse signal, and M
is an m× n matrix with m < n, recover the vector x.
A main success in compressed sensing (CS) is that there are efficient algorithms [BD08, NT08] for
Problem 3.1 when the matrix M satisfies a property called the RIP.
Definition 3.2 (Restricted Isometry Property (RIP)). An m× n matrix M has the (k, δ)-restricted
isometry property ((k, δ)-RIP) if for all k-sparse vectors v we have,
(1− δ) · ‖v‖ ≤ ‖Mv‖ ≤ (1 + δ) · ‖v‖ .
Recall that in our main problem (Problem 2.1), we want to recover the top-k coefficients of xˆ = Fx,
where xˆ is approximately k-sparse, given a corrupted vector y = x+ e. The key idea is to notice that
we can write y as [F−1 I]
[
xˆ
e
]
, where xˆ is approximately k-sparse and e is t-sparse. This is almost
the same setup as Problem 3.1. In fact, we have more knowledge about the structure of sparsity of the
vector
[
xˆ
e
]
∈ C2n that we want to recover.
The problem of recovery with structured sparsity, has been studied under the heading of Model-Based
CS [BCDH10, HIS15, HIS14, BIS17]. In our setting we want to model vectors of the form
[
xˆ
e
]
,
which have sparsity k in x and t in e. This motivates the following definition.
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Definition 3.3. LetMk,t ⊆ C2n be the set of all vectors where the first n coordinates are k-sparse
and the last n coordinates are t-sparse.3 Formally,
Mk,t := {v =
[
x
e
]
∈ C2n | x is k-sparse, e is t-sparse}.
We say that a matrix M has the ((k, t), δ)-RIP if for all vectors v ∈Mk,t,
(1− δ) · ‖v‖ ≤ ‖Mv‖ ≤ (1 + δ) · ‖v‖ .
Model-Based CS was first introduced in [BCDH10], for general sparsity models, and they proved
therein that Iterative Hard Thresholding (IHT) [BD08] indeed converges to a good solution to Problem
3.1, given that the measurement matrix M satisfies RIP for the model. We use this Model-Based IHT
approach to argue that Algorithm 1 finds a good solution to Problem 2.1. For us this translates to the
following theorem.
Theorem 3.4 ([BCDH10]). Let v ∈Mk,t and let y = Mv+β, where M ∈ Rn is a full-rank matrix
and β is a noise vector. Let v[T ] = IHT(y,M−1, k, t, T ). If M is ((3k, 3t), δ)-RIP, with δ ≤ 0.1,
then ∥∥∥v[T ] − v∥∥∥ ≤ 2−T · ‖v‖+ 4 · ‖β‖ .
We use the above theorem to prove that Algorithm 1 also converges to a good solution. Another key
technique we use in our proofs is an uncertainty principle for specific structured matrices.
Lemma 3.5 (General Uncertainty Principle). Let F be a matrix in Cn×n such that each entry Fij
has |Fij | ≤ α. Let x be a k-sparse vector in Cn and y = Fx. Then ‖y‖∞ ≤ α ·
√
k · ‖x‖.
Proof. For all i ∈ [n] we have
|(Fx)i| =
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
j∈[n]
Fijxj
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∑
j∈[n]
|Fij | · |xj |
≤ α ·
∑
j∈[n]
|xj |
≤ α ·
√
k · ‖x‖
where the third line follows from our assumption on the entries in F and the fourth line follows from
the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality. Since y = Fx we have ‖y‖∞ = ‖Fx‖∞ = maxi∈[n](|(Fx)i|) ≤
α · √k · ‖x‖ by the above.
Note that when F is the normalized Fourier matrix, this is the same as the folklore Fourier uncertainty
principle with α = 1/
√
n. One can check that for transformation matrices corresponding to Discrete
Cosine and Sine Transforms and their 2D analogs we have α = O(
√
1/n).
Finally to prove Theorem 2.2, we first prove that the matrix M = [F−1 I] has the RIP (Lemma 3.6
below).
Lemma 3.6. Let F be an orthonormal matrix, such that each entry Fij has |Fij | = O(1/
√
n). Then
the matrix M = [F−1 I] ∈ Cn×2n satisfies ((3k, 3t), δ)- RIP with δ ≤ 0.1, when t = O(n/k).
Equivalently, for all vectors v =
[
xˆ
e
]
, such that xˆ is 3k-sparse and e is at most 3t = O(n/k)-sparse,
(1− δ) · ‖v‖ ≤ ‖Mv‖ ≤ (1 + δ) · ‖v‖ .
3Recall that Mk was the set of all k-sparse vectors in C. Note that Mk,t is different from Mk+t which is
the set of all vectors ∈ C2n that are k + t-sparse.
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Proof. We will prove that [F−1 I] has the RIP for all v =
[
xˆ
e
]
∈M3k,3t. That is,
0.9 ·
∥∥∥∥[xˆe
]∥∥∥∥ ≤ ∥∥∥∥[F−1 I] [xˆe
]∥∥∥∥ ≤ 1.1 · ∥∥∥∥[xˆe
]∥∥∥∥ .
Note that the right-hand inequality follows immediately: Since F−1 is orthonormal we have that∥∥∥∥[F−1 I] [xˆe
]∥∥∥∥ = ∥∥F−1xˆ+ e∥∥ ≤ ∥∥F−1xˆ∥∥+ ‖e‖ = ‖xˆ‖+ ‖e‖ = ∥∥∥∥[xˆe
]∥∥∥∥ ≤ 1.1 ∥∥∥∥[xˆe
]∥∥∥∥.
Since x is k-sparse and F satisfies the hypotheses of the Uncertainty Principle (Lemma 3.5),
with α = O(1/
√
n), we have that
∥∥F−1xˆ∥∥∞ ≤ α · √k · ‖xˆ‖. Using this, we will prove that,∥∥F−1xˆ+ e∥∥ ≥ 0.9√‖xˆ‖2 + ‖e‖2, when the sparsity of e is at most O(n/k).
Since e is t-sparse, without loss of generality assume that e = [e1, . . . , et, 0, . . . , 0] and F−1xˆ =
[x1, . . . , xn] with |xi| ≤ α ·
√
k · ‖x‖. We have that,∥∥F−1xˆ+ e∥∥2 ≥ t∑
i=1
(|xi| − |ei|)2 +
n∑
i=t+1
x2i+1
= ‖x‖2 + ‖e‖2 − 2
t∑
i=1
|xi| · |ei|
≥ ‖x‖2 + ‖e‖2 − 2 · α ·
√
k ‖x‖
∑
|ei| (Uncertainty Principle)
≥ ‖x‖2 + ‖e‖2 − 2 · α ·
√
k ‖x‖ · √t ‖e‖ (Cauchy-Shwartz inequality)
= ‖x‖2 + ‖e‖2 −O(
√
kt/n ‖x‖ ‖e‖) (1)
We want that
∥∥F−1x+ e∥∥ ≥ 0.9√‖x‖2 + ‖e‖2. Plugging in equation 1 and moving terms around
we get that this happens when t = O(n/k). This completes the proof of the lemma.
We will now prove Theorem 2.2, by combining the above lemmas.
Proof of the main theorem: Now we will prove that the RIP property ofM = [F−1 I] proved above,
combined with the Uncertainty Principle (Lemma 3.5) and Theorem 3.4 imply the main theorem.
Consider y = F−1xˆ + e = F−1xˆh(k) + F−1xˆt(k) + e, where
∥∥xˆt(k)∥∥ ≤  ‖x‖ and e is t-sparse.
Using β = F−1xˆt(k), we can rewrite this expression as, y = [F−1 I]
[
xˆh(k)
e
]
+ β = Mv + β,
where ‖β‖ = ∥∥F−1xˆt(k)∥∥ = ∥∥xˆt(k)∥∥ ≤  ‖x‖, since F is orthonormal. In Lemma 3.6 we proved
that the matrix M is ((3k, 3t), δ)-RIP (with δ = 0.1) for the setMk,t.
At the ith iteration of the IHT algorithm let
[
xˆ[i]
e[i]
]
be our estimate of
[
xˆh(k)
e
]
. At the T th iteration,
by Theorem 3.4 we have the guarantee that,∥∥∥∥[xˆ[T ]e[T ]
]
−
[
xˆh(k)
e
]∥∥∥∥ ≤ 2−T ·√‖x‖2 + ‖e‖2 + 4 ‖β‖ ≈ 4 ‖xˆ‖ (2)
=⇒
∥∥∥xˆ[T ] − xˆk∥∥∥2 + ∥∥∥e[T ] − e∥∥∥2 ≤ 162 ‖xˆ‖2 , (3)
since we set T such that 2−T ·
√
‖x‖2 + ‖e‖2 ≈ 0. Note that 3 already gives a weak L2-L2 guarantee
on
∥∥xˆ[T ] − xˆh(k)∥∥ but we will derive a stronger L∞-L2 guarantee.
Consider the T th iteration of IHT, and define a vector z := F (y − e[i−1]). The IHT algorithm sets
xˆ[T ] = zh(k). We have that,
y = F−1xˆ+ e = F−1z + e[i−1] ⇔ xˆ− z = F (e[T−1] − e)
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Figure 1: Example experimental conditions. The left 3 images depict an original MNIST image,
the image corrupted by JSMA, and our corrected image. The right three images show an original
Fashion-MNIST image, the image corrupted by CW, and our corrected image.
Since both e, e[T−1] are t-sparse, we have that the vector e[T−1] − e is 2t-sparse. By the uncertainty
principle 3.5, we get that, ‖xˆ− z‖∞ ≤
√
2t/n
∥∥e[T ] − e∥∥
2
= O( ‖xˆ‖√t/n) by Equation 3.
This trivially implies that
∥∥xˆh(k) − zh(k)∥∥∞ = O( ‖xˆ‖√t/n) which implies ∥∥xˆh(k) − zh(k)∥∥ =
O( ‖xˆ‖√kt/n).
4 Experiments
4.1 L0 Adversarial attacks
We evaluated our framework on three leading L0 attacks in the literature: the JSMA Attack of
Papernot et al [PMJ+15], the L0 attack from Carlini and Wagner (CW) [CW16], and the adversarial
patch from Brown et al [BMR+17]. We evaluated Algorithm 1 on the JSMA and CW attacks and
present these results in this section. We discuss experiments on the adversarial patch in Section 4.2.
We tested both JSMA and CW on two datasets: the MNIST handwritten digits [LeC98] and the
Fashion-MNIST [XRV17] dataset of clothing images. For each attack, we used randomly selected
targets. For both datasets we used a neural network composed of a convolutional layer (32 kernels of
3x3), max pooling layer (2x2), convolutional layer (64 kernels of 3x3), max pooling layer (2x2), fully
connected layer (128 neurons) with dropout (rate = .25) and an output softmax layer (10 neurons).
We used the Adam optimizer with cross-entropy loss and ran it for 10 epochs over the training
datasets.
For each dataset, we trained our neural network only on images that were projected onto their
top-k 2D-DCT coefficients. Here k is a parameter we tuned depending on the dataset (for MNIST
k = 40 and for Fashion-MNIST k = 35). For each dataset, we fixed its corresponding k across all
experiments reported here.
In all of our evaluations there were three experimental conditions: first we ran uncorrupted images
through the network to establish a baseline accuracy. Then we ran the L0 adversarial examples
through the network. Finally, we ran our correction algorithm on the adversarial examples and ran
the results through the network. Example images of these conditions can be seen in Figure 1.
For the JSMA, we ran an experiment for several different adversary noise budgets. For each budget,
we evaluated the network on the three experimental conditions. The accuracy vs L0 budget and loss vs
L0 budget graphs can be seen in Figure 2 on the MNIST and Fashion-MNIST datasets. Exact values
can be found in Appendix A. The results demonstrate that our correction algorithm successfully
defends against the JSMA attack. For example when the adversary corrupts 30 bits, it is able to drop
the accuracy of our network on the Fashion-MNIST dataset from 88.5% to 24.8% but after running
our recovery algorithm we get back up to 83.1%.
The CW attack works by finding a minimal set of pixels that can be corrupted to fool the network.
This means that the adversary’s budget will depend on the particular image being corrupted rather
than being fixed in advance. For this reason, we let the CW adversary choose how many pixels to
corrupt and allow ourselves to know its budget for each image. Note that the locations and magnitudes
of the noise are unknown to us. Since the budget varies across images, a plot like Figure 2 does not
make sense and we instead report the overall accuracy and loss of our correction algorithm in Table 3.
Again our correction algorithm is effective against CW. For example on the Fashion-MNIST dataset
the network’s test accuracy on original images was 87.8%. The CW attack was successful and the
network mislabeled every adversarial example. After running our correction algorithm, the accuracy
returns to 85.7%.
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Figure 2: Classification accuracy and loss for JSMA on MNIST (left) and Fashion-MNIST (right).
Blue lines show the performance of the network on original images (and hence does not change with
the number of coordinates corrupted). Red lines show the performance of the network on uncorrected
adversarial examples and green lines show the performance of the network on images that were
corrected by Algorithm 1
MNIST Adversarial Corrected F-MNIST Adversarial Corrected
Accuracy 99.0 0.0 72.8 87.8 0.0 85.7
Loss 0.002 0.115 0.095 0.035 0.140 0.040
Figure 3: Experimental results for our algorithm on the CW attack for the MNIST and Fashion-MNIST
datasets. Columns 2-4 show results for MNIST data and columns 5 to 7 show Fashion-MNIST.
As images grow larger they become less sparse in Fourier bases but natural images are still block-wise
sparse. In such cases our algorithm could be modified to correct images block by block, in which
case the network would need to be trained on images compressed block by block (e.g. as in JPEG).
This would work with the mild assumption that the corrupted locations are well-distributed across
blocks because then our recovery result could be applied to each block separately. Within each block
the corrupted locations could still be anywhere and of any magnitude. For images that are too large to
be sparse in Fourier bases, the block-wise approach may fail in the case where most of the L0 noise
resides in few blocks because in these blocks there will be too many corrupted coordinates to recover.
In the next section we study the extreme case where all of the error is concentrated contiguously. We
show that even in this extreme case our framework for L0-robust sparse transformations can be used
to guard against contiguous noise attacks even in large images.
We think that further extensions to our framework can be made for large images by exploiting their
blockwise sparsity. Large images may also have other kinds of sparse structure and a theoretical
approach similar to ours may be able to give guarantees in this setting. We believe this is an interesting
direction for future research.
4.2 Adversarial patch
In [BMR+17], the authors introduce a method for generating adversarial patches. These are targeted
attacks in the form of circular images that get overlayed on input images. They showed that their
patch effectively fools leading image classifiers into mislabeling patched images.
Notice that the adversarial patch is an example of L0 noise and so fits within our framework. The
patch attack is only successful when the patch is sufficiently large (~ 80 pixels in diameter for
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Figure 4: Example of the three image conditions in the patch experiment. Left is the original image
classified as ‘banana’ with probability .94. The middle, with the adversarial patch overlayed, is
classified as ‘toaster’ with probability .93. The right is the image after our Patchwise IHT algorithm,
which gets classified as ‘banana’ with probability .94.
224 × 224 images), which is larger than our algorithm can tolerate. Also images of this size are
less sparse in the Fourier domain and as discussed above, our approach may not be able to correct
contiguous noise on such images. Similarly we cannot train the neural networks on compressed
images as that would lead to non trivial loss as the images are less sparse. So in this section we use a
network that was pretrained on original ImageNet images.
We are able to use the contiguity of the noise with the mild sparsity of large images by using
Algorithm 2 to defend against the patch attack. Since image recovery is not possible in this setting,
our algorithm instead focuses on detecting the location of the contiguous noise. We detect the noise
by searching over contiguous blocks in the image and running Algorithm 1 on each block, where
we project e only to the block rather than top-t coordinates. Finally we find the block for which
the remaining image (y − e) is sparsest in the Fourier domain. We call this Patchwise IHT and a
formal description of the algorithm is given below. Note that for this particular set of adversarial
examples there may be other ways to detect the patch with pre-processing. We do not do any such
optimizations that are particular to the adversary and Patchwise IHT is based only on the mild sparsity
of the original images.
Algorithm 2 Patchwise Iterative Hard Thresholding (IHT)
Input: Positive integers k, t, T, and `. y = x+ e, where x ∈ Rn is approximately k-sparse in
the Fourier basis and e ∈ Rn is exactly t-sparse in the standard basis. Fourier matrix F .
Output: x′, approximation of the original signal x.
1: function IHT(y = F−1xˆ+ e, F, k, t, T, `)
2: x′ ← ~∞
3: for `× ` patch p in image do
4: xˆ[1] ← ~0
5: e[1] ← ~0
6: for i = 1 · · ·T do
7: xˆ[i+1] ← (F (y − e[i]))h(k)
8: e[i+1] ← (y − F−1xˆ[i])h(t)
9: end for
10: if
∥∥xˆ[T+1]∥∥ < ‖x′‖ then
11: x′ = F−1xˆ[T+1]
12: end if
13: end for
14: return x′
15: end function
We took 700 random images from ImageNet and for classification we used pretrained ResNet-50
network [HZRS15]. We ran each image through the network in our three experimental conditions,
depicted in Figure 4.
Figure 5 shows the results of our experiment. The patch was a successful attack (Top-5 accuracy
dropped from 92.3% to 63.9% and Top-1 from 76.4% to 12.0%). After correcting, Top-5 accuracy
jumped to 80.4% (Top-1: 59.7%). Only 1.0% of the original images were labeled as ‘toaster’ (none
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in the Top-1), but ‘toaster’ was in the Top-5 in 99.0% of the patched images with 85.7% being the
most confident label. Notably, very few corrected images were labeled as ‘toaster’ (Top-5: 7.4%,
Top-1: 4.7%).
Figure 5: Experimental results for Algorithm 2. The left plot depicts the accuracy of the network in
our three experimental conditions. The right plot shows the percentage of images labeled as ‘toaster’
under the same three conditions.
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A JSMA experimental results
MNIST Accuracy 0 5 10 15 20 25
Original Images 98.7 98.7 98.7 98.7 98.7 98.7
Adversarial Images 98.7 95.4 83.9 70.6 57.5 48.7
Corrected Images 98.7 97.7 95.3 93.5 90.8 88.5
MNIST Accuracy 30 35 40 45 50 55
Original Images 98.7 98.7 98.7 98.7 98.7 98.7
Adversarial Images 41.0 35.1 32.4 31.2 29.9 31.1
Corrected Images 86.1 84.6 81.3 80.9 79.4 77.7
MNIST Loss 0 5 10 15 20 25
Original Images 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
Adversarial Images 0.05 0.16 0.68 1.64 3.07 4.37
Corrected Images 0.05 0.08 0.19 0.27 0.39 0.54
MNIST Loss 30 35 40 45 50 55
Original Images 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
Adversarial Images 6.03 7.86 8.86 10.03 11.15 10.92
Corrected Images 0.69 0.80 1.02 1.09 1.17 1.31
Figure 6: Experimental results for the JSMA attack on MNIST. The columns represent the adversary’s
budget: the number of pixels corrupted from 0 to 55 in increments of 5, given in the first row. The top
two tables show accuracy results on the MNIST for the three experimental conditions. The bottom
two tables show the cross-entropy loss across the the conditions and budgets.
F-MNIST Accuracy 0 5 10 15 20 25
Original Images 88.5 88.5 88.5 88.5 88.5 88.5
Adversarial Images 88.5 83.3 71.0 57.3 41.6 32.2
Corrected Images 88.5 87.8 86.9 86.1 85.3 84.9
F-MNIST Accuracy 30 35 40 45 50 55
Original Images 88.5 88.5 88.5 88.5 88.5 88.5
Adversarial Images 24.8 19.3 20.3 16.6 15.6 16.5
Corrected Images 83.1 82.6 82.7 81.4 80.7 80.2
F-MNIST Loss 0 5 10 15 20 25
Original Images 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36
Adversarial Images 0.36 0.49 0.95 1.65 3.02 4.23
Corrected Images 0.36 0.34 0.37 0.39 0.41 0.44
F-MNIST Loss 30 35 40 45 50 55
Original Images 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36
Adversarial Images 5.37 7.49 7.17 9.25 10.03 10.64
Corrected Images 0.49 0.53 0.52 0.58 0.62 0.65
Figure 7: Experimental results for the JSMA attack on Fashion-MNIST. The columns represent the
adversary’s budget: the number of pixels corrupted from 0 to 55 in increments of 5, given in the first
row. The top two tables show accuracy results on the Fashion-MNIST for the three experimental
conditions. The bottom two tables show the cross-entropy loss across the the conditions and budgets.
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